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GROMAN-OR NAMORG-REVISITED; THE




Continuity of shareholder interest is a familiar and essential element of
corporate reorganizations. Simply stated, this doctrine requires the owner of
an acquired corporation to retain a continuing proprietary interest in a cor-
poration that acquires his corporation. If he holds such an interest, con-
tinuity will exist and, assuming fulfillment of other requirements, a tax-free
reorganization will occur. In contrast, an outright sale of a corporation's
assets or stock will not qualify as a tax-free reorganization because there is no
continuity of interest. As first cautioned by the Second Circuit, a "sale of the
assets of one corporation to another for cash without the retention of any
interest by the seller in the purchaser is quite outside" the purview of the
reorganization statutes. Sales and reorganizations are mutually exclusive.
Tax practitioners can easily describe contrasting examples of reorgani-
zations and sales. A shareholder's exchange of stock in a merger under state
law will be considered an "A" reorganization of all of the consideration he
and the other shareholders receive is stock of the corporation that survives
the merger, or, at least if the Internal Revenue Service is to grant a ruling,
no more than half the consideration he receives is property other than stock.
2
On the other hand, a shareholder's receipt of too much consideration other
than stock or, indeed, receipt solely of non-stock consideration will not be
considered an exchange that has taken place as part of a reorganization.
Instead, the shareholder will have sold his stock.
Tax lawyers also can easily recount less clear situations, cases where the
intended corporate acquisition was not readily classified as a reorganization
or as a sale of the acquired corporation's assets or stock. This article ad-
dresses one aspect of the grey area. It explores the problem of remote con-
tinuity, specifically as it arises in successive mergers.
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify the "bottom line" of this
* A.B., Washington University, 1970; J.D., University of Cincinnati College of Law,
1973; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1976. Associate Professor of Law, Northern
Illinois University. The author would like to thank William Natbony for his comments.
I. Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. dened,
288 U.S. 599 (1933).
2. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A)(1982); Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568 (for ruling purposes,
50% interest is necessary). But see John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (38%
interest sufficient for reorganization). The value of the stock is determined by reference to the
trial court opinion, John A. Nelson Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 1031 (1931).
Reorganizations are defined by I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(1982). An A reorganization is described
by § 368(a)(1)(A), a B reorganization is described by § 368(a)(l)(B), and so on through G reor-
ganizations, § 368(a)(I)(G). Set generally infra text accompanying notes 19-28.
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article. Continuity of interest and concomitant reorganization status are
sought-or avoided-only to obtain specific tax goals. Foremost among the
benefits of engaging in a reorganization is the nonrecognition of gain to the
participants. Neither the corporate transferor, the corporate transferee, nor
the shareholders of the acquired corporation recognize gain or loss upon its
or their exchange of stock or assets for stock. 3 The tax attributes of the cor-
porate transferor, such as net operating losses and the method of accounting,
also are carried over in certain reorganizations.4 On the other hand, the
parties may wish the exchange to be a taxable sale. Then, for example, the
transferee corporation can obtain a stepped-up basis in the transferor's assets
and thereby increase the amount of its depreciation deductions. 5 A reorgan-
ization cannot take place if there is no continuity of interest 6 and this article
analyzes that essential element, especially as that element develops into the
problem of remote continuity.
Remote continuity has been used as a catch-all phrase to describe cer-
tain transactions that apparently have not been intended to be sales, but
which have failed to qualify as reorganizations for Federal income tax pur-
poses. Shareholders of the acquired corporation technically fail to obtain a
continuing interest in the acquiring corporation and so there is no continuity
of interest. Remote continuity can prevent a reorganization from transpir-
ing or, even if one takes place, can compel gain recognition to shareholders
of the acquired corporation with respect to stock used that is not stock of the
acquiring corporation. 7 Remote continuity occurs in triangular reorganiza-
tions, acquisitions involving not only the acquired and acquiring corpora-
tions, but the parent or subsidiary of one of these two corporations as well.
For example, in a triangular reorganization the acquiring corporation,
whose stock is given as consideration to the acquired corporation, might
drop the assets of the acquired corporation into one of its subsidiaries rather
than retaining them. At one time, the transaction failed to conform to the
condition that the acquiring corporation be a party to a reorganization. 8 As
3. See I.R.C. §§ 361, 1032, 354, and 355 (1982 & West Supp. 1984); see also infra text
accompanying notes 31-38. Ordinarily, a taxpayer will prefer to recognize losses immediately,
in order to reduce income upon which he is taxed. On the other hand, he will wish to avoid
recognizing gain. See I.R.C. §§ 62, 63, 165, and 1202 (1982 & West Supp. 1984).
4. See I.R.C. §§ 381(a)(2), 382, and 383 (1982 & West Supp. 1984) (carry-over of tax
attributes in A, C, F, G, and certain nondivisive D reorganizations).
5. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168, 1011, and 1012 (depreciation and Accelerated Cost Recovery
System deductions and basis therein). But cf. I.R.C. § 338 (1982 & West Supp. 1984) (stock
purchase can be treated as asset purchase, allowing step-up in basis).
6. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)(1980)., See also Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1960).
Several recommendations have proposed substantial modification to the present continuity
of interest requirements. See Staff of the Senate Finance Committee, 98 Cong., 2d Sess., Prelim-
inary Report on Reform and Simplification of the Income Taxation of Corporations, reprintedin
DAILY TAX REP. (CCH) J-1 (Sept. 26, 1983); Committee on Corporate Stockholder Relation-
ships, American Bar Association, Tax Section Recommendaton No. 1981-5, reprinted zn 34 TAX LAW.
1386 (1981); Federal Income Tax Project Subchapter C, Proposals of the American Law Insti-
tute and Reporter's Study (1980).
7. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a), 356(a) (1982); infia text accompanying notes 35-36. Compare Bus
& Transport Securities v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 391 (1935) (no reorganization) with Groman v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937) (reorganization but gain recognized).
8. See Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938), infra notes 104-08; in/ia note 144
(Bashford statutorily overruled). The acquiring corporation technically need not be a party to a
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explained below, continuity in triangular reorganizations can be identified
with the need for a party to a reorganization. If stock of a corporation that is
not a party to a reorganization is used in a triangular reorganization, the
courts and the Internal Revenue Service historically have determined that
there is a problem of remote continuity and that continuity does not exist.
Remote continuity is a shorthand term, one that has not been used by
the courts nor by the Service. For example, in two early Supreme Court
cases that first presented the problem of remote continuity, shareholders of
acquired corporations respectively exchanged their stock for stock of an ac-
quiring corporation's parent and for stock of a corporation which then trans-
ferred the acquired corporation's assets to a subsidiary. 9 Clearly, the
Supreme Court thought there was no continuity. It compelled the acquired
corporation's shareholders to recognize gain (outside the reorganization stat-
utes) on receipt of the aforementioned stock, but not because of a problem
with remote continuity. Rather, it declared that, in both cases, the afore-
mentioned stock had not been stock of "a party to a reorganization,"' 0 and
therefore the benefits of engaging in a reorganization did not adhere to this
stock. I These exchanges, transactions that were not intended to be sales,
still failed to be the reorganizations that had been planned because stock of a
related corporation, not stock of a "party to a reorganization," had been
used. 12
The problem of remote continuity can arise when statutory mergers fol-
low one another. As explained below, the legislative neutering of the cir-
cumstances where the problem can arise makes successive mergers a likely
candidate for remote continuity.' 3 To illustrate the susceptibility of succes-
sive mergers, consider a parent corporation that merges into its subsidiary, a
downstream merger, followed by the successor's merger into a third corpora-
tion, a lateral merger. (Matters could then be complicated by the acquired
subsidiary corporation's receiving stock of the acquiring corporation's par-
ent, not of the acquiring corporation itself. The transaction might still qual-
ify as a reorganization, but the continuity-the acquired parent's
shareholders' continuing proprietary interest-would be in a more distant
corporation.) 14
If the mergers occurred pursuant to a single plan of reorganization, then
the shareholders of the acquired parent may not be considered to have re-
reorganization. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(1982). As is described below, however, the benefits of
participating in a reorganization generally depend upon a corporation's characterization as a
party to a reorganization and upon a shareholder's ownership of stock in such a corporation. See
also infia text accompanying 31-38 and 128-31.
9. See Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 83-84 (1937); Helvering v. Bashford, 302
U.S. 454, 455-56. (1938). See ihfra text accompanying notes 91-108.
10. See I.R.C. § 368(b) (1982).
11. See Groman, 302 U.S. at 90-98; Bashford, 302 U.S. at 458.
12. See generally B. BITrKER ANDJ. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14.11, at 14-22 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BITrKER AND
EUSTICEl (discussion of remote continuity).
13. See in/6a text accompanying notes 133-149.
14. See also I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A), -(a)(2)(D); Edwards Motor Transport Co. v. Commis-




ceived stock of the acquiring corporation-the acquired subsidiary. Instead,
they could be treated as having received stock of a third corporation, the
ultimate acquiring corporation, and be compelled to recognize gain, because
they do not possess the requisite continuity. If the mergers occur pursuant to
two rather than a single plan of reorganization, then target shareholders can
avoid recognizing gain in both reorganizations, because of continuity. In the
case of each merger, the shareholders of the target corporation will have
received stock of the corporation that actually acquired their corporation.
15
Business conditions may compel engaging in two successive mergers.
For example, an acquiring corporation probably will wish to dismantle the
management structure of the target companies, especially if it finds that
management to be redundant. Such dismantling can be obtained through
the downstream and lateral mergers described in the preceding paragraph. '
6
But despite compelling circumstances for engaging in successive mergers, no
reorganization can occur if the problem of remote continuity is found to
exist. This article attempts to reconcile the tension between the constraints
of business goals and the requirements of federal income tax laws, so that
both the downstream and the lateral mergers can qualify as reorganizations
under the tax law. This article will initially describe acquisitive reorganiza-
tions and define the terms necessary for understanding whether or not a reor-
ganization has occurred and what will happen if there is a reorganization. It
then describes the development of continuity of interest by analyzing statu-
tory and interpretative developments. Finally, it reviews the ramifications of
several modes of analyzing the problem of remote continuity of interest.
I. THE HISTORY OF CONTINUITY OF SHAREHOLDER INTEREST
A. Types of Reorganizaions
A reorganization is a corporate transformation entailing the combina-
15. The benefits of engaging in a reorganization inure to the target corporation and its
shareholders only if they exchange their assets or stock pursuant to a "plan of reorganization."
See I.R.C. §§ 354(a), 361(a) (1982); infia text accompanying notes 33-36. Section 354(a) re-
quires the target's shareholders to receive stock of a party to the reorganization, ie., the acquir-
ing corporation, under the plan of reorganization. Thus, if the plan for the mergers discussed in
the text were for the acquired parent to merge into the acquired subsidiary, then the acquired
parent's shareholders' receipt of the acquiring corporation's stock would not qualify for nonrec-
ognition under § 354(a). The reason for this is that the acquiring corporation is not a party to
the reorganization, nor was its stock received pursuant to an appropriate plan.
Alternatively, it also could be argued that the plan was to merge the acquired parent into
the acquiring corporation, and that the stock the acquired parent's shareholders received, that
of the acquired subsidiary, was not stock of a party to the reorganization. See Helvering v.
Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938).
16. Cf American Bronze Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1111, 1124-29 (1975) (simplifica-
tion of business structure is good business purpose). Legal restrictions also may lead to the
particular structure of a reorganization. For example, the various regulatory approvals neces-
sary to consummate mergers between commercial banks could lead to engaging in downstream
and forward triangular mergers in order to obtain the approval of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the part of the U.S. Treasury Department that regulates national banks, rather than that
of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. See Note, The Line of Commerce for Commercal Bank
Mergers." Product-Oriented Redefniton, 96 HARV. L. REV. 907, 909 n.15 (1983). Recently, the
Comptroller has held a less rigorous view than the Federal Reserve of what mergers will have
anti-competitive effects.
[Vol. 61:3
REMOTE CONTINUITY OF INTEREST
tion, devolution, or division of preexisting corporations. Continuity of inter-
est is an element only of acquisitive and divisive reorganizations, so only
these types of reorganizations are discussed. ' 7 Corporate rearrangements de-
scribed in Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") section 368(a)(1)(A), -(B), -(C),
and some situations described in section 368(a)(1)(D) are acquisitive types of
reorganizations in which one corporation acquires the assets or stock of an-
other corporation.' 8 A divisive reorganization must conform with sections
368(a)(1)(D) and 355.9
In an A reorganization, two corporations merge or consolidate under
the corporation laws of the United States, a state, a territory, or the District
of Columbia. 20 Two corporations combine to form a new, third corporation
in a consolidation, whereas one of two combining corporations survives in a
merger, having acquired the property of the other corporation. 2i In either
case, the target corporation transfers its property to the surviving corpora-
tion, and the target's shareholders obtain stock of the latter corporation.
The acquiring corporation need not use voting stock, and it may use greater
amounts of non-stock consideration than can be used in other types of
reorganizations.
22
In contrast, B and C reorganizations depend upon compliance with
strict consideration tests. In a B reorganization, shareholders of the acquired
corporation exchange their stock solely for voting stock of the acquiring cor-
poration. After the reorganization, the acquiring corporation must own at
least eighty percent of the voting stock and at least eighty percent of all other
stock of the target corporation. 23 Thus, the acquiring corporation obtains a
subsidiary. In a C reorganization, the acquired corporation exchanges sub-
stantially all of its assets solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation.
Although the acquisition of assets is a shared feature of A and C reorganiza-
tions, more stringent requirements are imposed on C reorganizations. Gen-
erally, the acquiring corporation must use its voting stock as consideration in
a C reorganization, and this stock must constitute at least eighty percent of
the consideration paid to the acquired corporation.
2 4
17. See zt/a text accompanying notes 50-85 (regarding development of continuity in reor-
ganizations), see also n/ta text accompanying notes 280-89 (regarding continuity in divisive reor-
ganizations and § 355 distributions). Regarding other reorganizations, see ilna note 28; Hickok
v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 80 (1959),nonacq., 19 59 -2 C.B. 8 nnacq. withdrawn, 1977-2 C.B. 3; Rev.
Rul. 77-479, 1977-2 C.B. 119; Rev. Rul. 77-415, 1977-2 C.B. 311 (continuity unnecessary in
recapitalizations); H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1980), reprintedin 1980-2 C.B.
620, 638-39; Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness Redux: The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 Proposals-
Corporate Aspects, 36 TAX L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1980) (regarding continuity in G reorganizations).
18. See i.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A)-(D), 354 (1982).
19. See generaly BrrrKER AND EUSTICE, Supra note 12, at 14.
20. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (1983).
21. 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7041
(perm. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
22. See infra text accompanying notes 23-24.
23. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), (c) (1982). The acquiring corporation also can use the voting
stock of a corporation that controls it.
24. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C), (c) (1982). The acquiring corporation also can use the voting
stock of a corporation that controls it. Compare I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1982) and John A. Nelson
Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) with I.R.C. § 368(a)(I)(C) and (a)(2)(B) (1982), to illus-
trate the laxer standards imposed on A reorganizations.
1984]
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In a D reorganization, one corporation transfers some or all of its assets
to a second corporation. Immediately after the transfer, the first corporation
or one or more of its shareholders controls the second corporation. 25 If the
reorganization is acquisitive, the acquired corporation must transfer substan-
tially all its assets and distribute the acquiring corporation's stock to its
shareholders, so that it must, in effect, liquidate. 26 Such a reorganization
could occur, for example, when a parent corporation wishes to eliminate a
subsidiary but not dispose of any of the subsidiary's assets. 27 If section
368(a)(1)(D) is the basis for splitting a corporation with multiple businesses
into multiple corporations, then it is a divisive reorganization. 28
B. The Benefits of Engaging in a Reorganization
Being a "party to a reorganization" or a shareholder of a "party to a
reorganization" is a statutory prerequisite to enjoyment of the benefits of a
reorganization. A party to a reorganization includes a corporation resulting
from the reorganization, and both of the corporations in an acquisitive reor-
ganization. 29 And, since 1954, as various triangular corporate acquisitions
have been included in the definition of a reorganization, the meaning of a
party to a reorganization also has been expanded to include all of the corpo-
rations that participate in these acquisitions.
30
Section 361 provides that a corporation that is a party to a reorganiza-
tion shall recognize no gain or loss upon its exchange of property, pursuant
to a plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another corpora-
tion that also is a party to the reorganization. 31 Thus, section 361 accords
nonrecognition treatment to the target corporation, subject only to its re-
ceipt of "boot," i'e., consideration other than stock or securities.
32
25. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1982).
26. See I.R.C. § 354(b) (1982). A distribution of the controlled corporation's stock in a
divisive D reorganization is made pursuant to § 355, not § 354, so that the transferor's liquida-
tion is unnecessary in the divisive reorganization. See generally BrrrKER AND EUSTICE, supra
note 12, at 14.16.
27. Where a reorganization can be characterized as a C or D reorganization,
§ 368(a)(2)(A) requires the reorganization to be treated as a D reorganization. Under appropri-
ate circumstances, the reorganization also might be considered an A, E, or F reorganization. See
BITTKER AND EusTICE, supra note 12, at 14.16.
28. E, F, and G reorganizations complete the roster of reorganizations. E and F reorgani-
zations, which are recapitalizations and mere changes in a corporation's identity, form, or place
of organization, respectively. Such reorganizations do not involve a substantive combination or
division. In a recapitalization, a corporation's capital structure is altered. An F reorganization
might be effected to gain, for example, the benefit of organizing under another state's law.
Neither of these corporate devolutions, however can be regarded as acquisitive reorganizations.
G reorganizations were added to the Code by the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980. See I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(G) (1982). See also I.R.C. § 368(a)(3) (1982). In a G reorganization, one corpora-
tion transfers all or some of its assets to another corporation in a Chapter II bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. As in a D reorganization, the transferor corporation must either transfer substantially
all assets and distribute the acquiring corporation's stock or securities to its stock or security
holders, or one or more of the holders of its securities or stock must control the transferee corpo-
ration after the reorganization. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(G) (1982).
29. See I.R.C. § 368(b) (1982).
30. See I.R.C. § 368(c). See generally inira text accompanying notes 142-45.
31. See 1.R.C. § 361(a) (1982).
32. See I.R.C. § 361(b) (1982).
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The treatment of the corporate transferee, the acquiring corporation,
does not depend upon its status as a party to a reorganization. A corpora-
tion that acquires property in exchange for its stock recognizes neither gain
nor loss under section 1032, 3 3 regardless of whether or not a reorganization
has occurred. Its basis in the property that it acquires is determined by ref-
erence to the transferor's basis in the property, increased by the amount of
gain, if any, the transferor recognizes on the transfer of such property.
34
Recognition of gain or loss to shareholders of the acquired corporation
is determined under section 354 or section 355. Under section 354, the target
corporation's shareholders do not recognize loss. They recognize gain, but
only to the extent of boot received. 3 5 They must exchange stock or securities
in their corporation solely for stock or securities in another corporation, i.e.,
the aforementioned acquiring corporation. Both corporations must be par-
ties to the reorganization and the exchange must occur pursuant to a plan of
reorganization. 36 A section 355 distribution is made in connection with a
divisive D reorganization. Generally, holders of stock or securities of a cor-
poration, that owns at least eighty percent of another corporation's voting
and other stock, receive the controlled corporation's stock or securities pursu-
ant to the section 355 distribution. Gain is recognized to the extent of boot.
Loss is not recognized. 3 7 Section 358 provides that the basis of stock or se-
curities received by the acquired corporation's stock or securities holders
shall be the same as basis of the stock or securities transferred, increased by
the amount of any gain recognized and decreased by the amount of any loss
recognized and the value of the boot received in the exchange. 38
Being a party to a reorganization or a shareholder of such a party ac-
cords certain benefits. As explained below, not being such a party is a mani-
festation of the problem of remote continuity.
39
C. Earo Statutoy Development
Section 368(a)(1) did not spring forth fully grown like Athena did from
Jupiter's forehead.4° Rather, its pedestrian origin was a 1918 statute, which
was much terser than its contemporary descendant. Continuity of interest
was not and never has been an explicit statutory requirement. 4' Instead, the
33. See I.R.C. § 1032(a) (1982).
34. See I.R.C. § 362(b) (1982).
35. See I.R.C. §§ 354 and 356 (1982 & West Supp. 1984).
36. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a), 356(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1984). Section 356(a)(2) characterizes
gain as capital gain or as ordinary income. Compare Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th
Cir. 1973), with Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), and Rev. Rul. 75-83,
1975-1 C.B. 112 (which illustrates the present state of characterizing gain under § 356(a)(2)).
Regarding the "plan of reorganization" under I.R.C. §§ 354(a) & 361(a), see generaloy
Faber, The Use and Mtnuse of the Plan of Reorganizattn Concept, 38 TAX L. REV. 515 (1983).
37. See I.R.C. §§ 355, 356 and 368(c) (1982 & West Supp. 1984). See also in/ia text accom-
panying notes 273-76.
38. See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (1982). Other doctrines further limit reorganizations. In addi-
tion to continuity of interest, reorganizations must possess a business purpose as well as a con-
tinuity of business enterprise. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b), -1(c), -
2
(g) (1980).
39. See in/ira notes 86-131.
40. See BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 11-12 (Modern Library).
41. See generally Turnier, Continuity of Interest-Its Application to Shareholders of the Acquiring
1984]
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doctrine of continuity has been integrated into the development of reorgani-
zations, first by judicial sanction, and then by statutory amendments that, in
effect, have imposed specific continuity standards on certain types of
reorganizations.
Section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 191842 treated property as the
equivalent of cash when it was exchanged for other property, for purposes of
determining gain or loss from the exchange. No gain or loss, however, oc-
curred under the statute upon the exchange by a person of stock or securities
for new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value if the
exchange occurred in connection with "the reorganization, merger, or con-
solidation of a corporation."
'4 3
Only in 1921 did Congress actually define the term "reorganization" as
a merger or consolidation, including the acquisition by one corporation of at
least a majority of the voting stock and of all other stock of an acquired
corporation or of substantially all the assets of the acquired corporation or of
substantially all the assets of the acquired corporation, as a recapitalization,
and as a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization. 44 These
reorganizations find their present counterparts in A, B, C, E, and F reorgani-
zations. 45 The list of reorganizations was expanded by the Revenue Act of
1924, which added modern D reorganizations to the list of events that quali-
fied as tax-free reorganizations.
46
The year 1924 also marked the introduction of a more comprehensive
reorganization scheme. The term "a party to a reorganization" was first
used in the Revenue Act of 1924. Like its modern day successor, it included
a corporation resulting from a reorganization. It also included both corpora-
tions in the case of an acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of
Corporation, 64 CAL. L. REV. 902, 912-14 (1976) (explaining the policy underlying early reorgan-
ization statutes).
42. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060 (1918).
43. Id No gain realization provision was expressly enacted in 1918. Rather, § 213(a) sim-
ply defined gross income to include gains. Cf S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918),
reprtnted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 117, 120, and H.R. REP. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919),
reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 130, 132. Not until the Revenue Act of 1924 was a gain realiza-
tion provision enacted, the precedessor of I.R.C. § 1001 (1982), in order to clarify the statutory
base of the concept. Revenue Act of 1924, infra note 46, § 202(a). See generally H. R. REP. No.
179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprintedin 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 241, 250.
Section 202(b) was modified by § 202(c)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1921, infta note 44, and
was again modified by § 203(b)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1924, infta note 46, when the predeces-
sor ofI.R.C. § 354(a)(1) was enacted, using language identical to the current statute. See I.R.C.
§ 354(a)(1) (1982).
44. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 230.
45. Section 202(c) (2) defined a reorganization as a "merger or consolidation (including the
acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or of substan-
tially all the properties of another corporation)," as well as E and F reorganizations. Although
the statute could be read as defining an A reorganization only as a B or C reorganization, the
Supreme Court held soon after the enactment of § 202 that A, B, and C reorganizations were
separate and distinct reorganizations. See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287
U.S. 462 (1933).
46. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(h)(1)(D), 43 Stat. 257-59. D reorganizations were
viewed as a common form of reorganization under state law, necessitating their beatification to
reorganization status in the federal tax laws. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 241, 252-53. See generally Turnier, supra note 41, at 911-16.
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the voting and other stock of another corporation. 47 Nonrecognition treat-
ment continued to be allowed to the acquired corporation, but only if it was
a party to a reorganization. 48 Nonrecognition treatment also was allowed to
that corporation's shareholders if stock or securities of the acquiring corpora-
tion was distributed to them pursuant to a plan of reorganization.
49
For the next ten years, the statutory definition of reorganizations was
not otherwise modified. But the terms "reorganization" and "party to a re-
organization" were the subjects of judicial analysis.
D. Eary Cases- Contznuity and Remote Continuzty
The Supreme Court first analyzed continuity of interest in 1933 in Pinel-
las Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner.50 Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Com-
pany exchanged its assets with another corporation for $400,000 cash and
$1,000,000 of short-term notes due no more than three and one-half months
after the exchange. 5 1 In addressing whether or not the transaction consti-
tuted a reorganization under a 1926 statute (which resembled the 1921 stat-
ute noted above), 52 the Court stated that "the seller must acquire an interest
in the affairs of the purchasing company more definite than that incident of
ownership of its short term purchase money notes." '53 The Court was unable
to distinguish between an exchange of assets for cash-a taxable sale-and
an exchange of assets for cash and short-term notes. Accordingly, the ex-
change was taxable.54 Although the requirements of a statutory reorganiza-
tion were not clearly defined by the Court, it squelched what it perceived to
be a taxable nonstatutory reorganization.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court relied upon Cortland Specialty
Co. v. Commissioner. 55 Cortland had been decided the year before Pinellas by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In Cortland, one corporation ex-
47. Revenue Act of 1924,supra note 46, § 203(h)(2). Introduction of the term was intended
to codify the Service's interpretation of the law. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924), reprinted bn 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 241, 251; S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924),
reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 266, 275. See generaly Magill, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1924, 24
COLLM. L. REx'. 836, 844-55 (1924). Unlike I.R.C. § 368(b), a party to a reorganization did not
include both parties to an acquisitive reorganization under § 203(h)(2). Since both parties
could qualify only if one acquired a majority of the other corporation's stock (then, a B reorgan-
ization), seemingly the acquired corporation in an A or C reorganization was not a party to a
reorganization. However, the statute was not so interpreted. See, e.g., Helvering v. Minnesota
Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935) (this point not raised in A reorganization).
48. Revenue Act of 1924, supra note 46, § 203(b)(3).
49. Revenue Act of 1924 § 203(b)(2). H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924),
reprttedin 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 241, 251, states that § 203(b)(2) did not modify earlier law. The
earlier statute--§ 202(c)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1921-provided nonrecognition treatment for
stock or securities "in a corporation a party to or resulting from such reorganization" received
by the acquired corporation's shareholders.
50. 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
51. See id. at 464.
52. The statute under examination was § 203 of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9
(1926). See supra note 44 (1921 statute).
53. 287 U.S. at 470. The Court also distinguished between A, B and C reorganizations.
An A reorganization was a distinct reorganization, not just a term that was void of meaning
other than to distinguish B and C reorganizations. See id. at 469. See supra note 45.
54. See 287 U.S. at 469.
55. 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
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changed its operating assets for cash of $53,000 and $160,000 of notes of
another corporation. 56 The notes matured at varying times, none more than
14 months after the exchange. 57 The taxpayer argued that even though the
transaction was not a merger under state law, it was a reorganization (under
the same 1926 statute under which Pinellas would be decided). 58 But the
Second Circuit distinguished between a cash sale and a statutory reorganiza-
tion.59 It held that a "sale of the assets of one corporation to another for
cash without the retention of any interest by the seller in the purchaser is
quite outside the objects of merger and consolidation statutes" 60 of the state
where the transaction had occurred and was not a reorganization under fed-
eral statute. Instead, "section 203 of the Revenue Act [of 1926] gives the
widest room for all kinds of changes in corporate structure, but does not
abandon the primary requisite that there must be some continuity of interest
on the part of transferor corporation or its stockholders in order to secure
exemption." 61 Such continuity was evident in the state laws under which
the exchange was effected and, therefore, was required by federal law as
well.6 2 As would be true of Pinellas, reorganizations were defined negatively:
regardless of what constituted a reorganization, the exchange of assets for
cash and short-term notes was not such a creature.
Two years after Pinellas, the Supreme Court again addressed continuity
of interest, this time defining it positively. The Court spoke in four simulta-
neous decisions.6 3 In the best known of these cases, Helvering v. Minnesota Tea
Co. ,64 the Court held that a corporation's exchange of all its assets for cash
and voting trust certificates constituted a reorganization because the trans-
feror had acquired a substantial enough proprietary interest in the acquiring
corporation.6 5 The voting trust certificates, which were deemed to be the
equivalent of stock, represented 56 percent of the consideration and the cash
represented 44 percent.66 The Court stated:
The transaction here was no sale, but partook of the nature of the
reorganization in that the seller acquired a definite and substantial
interest in the purchaser. . . . [A] large part of the consideration
was cash. This, we think, is permissible so long as the taxpayer
received an interest in the affairs of the transferee which repre-
sented a material part of the value of the transferred assets.
67
56. See id. at 938.
57. See id
58. See i. at 939.
59. Id.
60. Id Mergers and consolidations encompass the types of transactions described supra
text accompanying note 21, which the court differentiated from a cash sale. Id.
61. Id at 940.
62. Id
63. The Court also decided G & K Manufacturing Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 389 (1935),
at this time. The case concerned a reorganization, but no substantial decision was made. The
case was remanded and, therefore, has been excluded from the cases discussed in the text.
64. 296 U.S. 378 (1935).
65. See id at 385, 386.
66. See id at 381.
67. Id. at 386. This was a C reorganization executed under § 112(i)(1)(A) of the Revenue
Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791 (1928).
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Simultaneously, the Court held in John A. Nelson Co. v. Helver'ng,6 that
continuity of interest existed where 38 percent of the acquiring corporation's
consideration paid to the target corporation was nonvoting preferred stock,
even though cash constituted the rest of the consideration. 6 9 The acquired
corporation's shareholders obtained a "definite interest" in the acquiring
corporation, so that a reorganization was considered to have occurred. 70 In
the third case, Helvering v. Watts,7 1 the Supreme Court concluded that a reor-
ganization had occurred where a corporation exchanged its assets for stock
and long-term bonds of the acquiring corporation. 72 There, the stock repre-
sented 45 percent of the consideration. 73 Although the bonds were held to
be "securities" within the intendment of the law, the Court refrained from
addressing whether or not these securities alone would have created con-
tinuity of interest. The fourth opinion, regarding parties to a reorganization,
is discussed below.
74
Subsequently, the Supreme Court addressed continuity of interest in
LeTulle v. Scofield.75 In Le Tulle, a corporation exchanged all its assets for
cash of $50,000 and bonds of the acquiring corporation in the amount of
$750,000.76 The bonds were payable from one to twelve years after the ex-
change. 77 The Court decided that the long-term bonds did not establish a
continuity of interest, thereby answering the unspoken question asked in
Walts. 78 Regardless of the term of the bonds, their holder becomes a credi-
tor of the acquiring corporation, not the holder of a proprietary interest in
it. 79 Because of the absence of proprietary consideration, no reorganization
had occurred.80
Two aspects of continuity of shareholder interest were developed by
these cases that have become entrenched in current law. 8 ' First, the quality
of the consideration must be proprietary. Under Pinellas and Le Tulle,
neither short- nor long-term debt creates continuity. Rather, stock, even non-
voting preferred stock, as in Nelson, must constitute all or a sufficiently large
portion of the consideration. Of course, B and C reorganizations specifically
require that the stock used be voting stock.
68. 296 U.S. 374 (1935).
69. See id. at 376.
70. Id at 377. The transaction effected was a C reorganization, under § 203 of the Reve-
nue Act of 1926 supra note 52.
71. 296 U.S. 387 (1935). This was a B reorganization that was effected under § 203 of the
Revenue Act of 1924, supra note 46.
72. See 296 U.S. at 388.
73. See id
74. See infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
75. 308 U.S. 415 (1940).
76. Set id at 416.
77. See id
78. Set id. at 420-2 1.
79. See id
80. See id. at 421.
81. As noted at the start of this article, continuity of interest can be viewed as the continu-
ing interest of the acquired corporation's shareholder in the acquiring corporation. See, e.g.,
Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. Commentators, however, have argued variously that con-
tinuity should be measured against the acquiring corporation's shareholders, See Turnier, supra
note 41, at 928-41, and that continuity is unnecessary, Faber, Contrnuity of Interest and Bustess
Enterprse Is It Tine To Bury Some Sacred Cows, 36 TAx LAW. 239 (198 1).
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Secondly, the amount of the proprietary interest must be substantial.
The Supreme Court delineated between statutory reorganizations and other
transactions by whether or not the acquired corporation's shareholders' in-
terest was "definite and substantial. '8 2 Fifty-six percent was definite and
substantial, as was 38 percent. 83 It follows that receipt of a greater percent-
age of stock also qualifies as the requisite proprietary interest that will estab-
lish continuity. The proportion measured is of the amount of stock received
against the total consideration received. 84 Regardless of these lesser stan-
dards, however, the Internal Revenue Service presently states that it will not
issue rulings unless shareholders of the target corporation obtain and retain
stock of the acquiring corporation at least equal to 50 percent of the value of
all outstanding stock of the acquired corporation on the effective date of the
reorganization.
8 5
The Supreme Court also decided at an early time that remote con-
tinuity of interest was an inadequate form of continuity. It first reviewed the
issue entwined with the problem of remote continuity, whether or not a cor-
poration was a party to a reorganization, in 1935 in Bus & Transport Securities
v. Helvering.86 There, the controlling shareholder of the two acquired corpo-
rations formed another corporation whose stock he acquired in exchange for
stock of the first two corporations. 87 He then caused the new corporation to
exchange the stock of the other two corporations for the assets of the acquir-
ing corporation's newly formed subsidiary. 88 These assets consisted of some
of its parent's stock.
89
The Supreme Court concluded that neither of the exchanging parties
were parties to a reorganization since neither "acquired any definite immedi-
ate interest in the other." 9 The opinion summarily suggests that effecting a
merger through newly created corporations precludes those corporations
82. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. at 386; John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296
U.S. at 377.
83. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378; John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296
U.S. 374. Cf Kass v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 218 (1973) (less than 20% does not satisfy
continuity).
84. This comparison would be skewed if the consideration received were not the same
amount as the consideration given. Perhaps for this reason, Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568,
measures the stock of the acquiring corporation that was received by the acquired corporation's
shareholders against the value of the stock of the acquired corporation that they relinquished, in
stating how much stock they must retain. As noted by BrrTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 12, at
14.11, "a whale can swallow a minnow" because the quantitive comparison necessary to deter-
mine continuity is as stated above, not as the percentage of stock that the acquired corporation's
shareholders have received of the acquiring corporation's outstanding stock. Compare Helvering
v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (56% stock; 44% cash) and Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387
(45% stock; 55% long-term bonds) with Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287
U.S. 462 (1933). Reorganizations occurred in the first two cases, but not the third. The combi-
nation of stock with one type or another of non-stock consideration is irrelevant. BITTKER AND
EUSTICE, supra note 12, at 14.11; McGaffey & Hunt, Contiui'ty of Shareholder Interest i Acquisitive
Reorganziattons, 59 Taxes 659, 661-65 (1981). See also McGaffey & Hunt at 665-70 (effect of
valuation upon meeting Rev. Proc. 77-37, see supra note 2).
85. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
86. 296 U.S. 391 (1935).
87. See id. at 392.
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id at 393.
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from being parties to a reorganization. The Court appeared to sense that
the real merger occurred between the newly created corporations' ancestors
(the acquiring corporation's parent and the acquired corporations' subsidiar-
ies). And, since newly formed corporations had been interposed that were
not parties to a reorganization, no reorganization resulted.
The problem of remote continuity was reviewed again two years later in
the better known case of Groman v. Commissioner.9 1 There, continuity did not
exist because shareholders of the acquired corporation exchanged their stock
for (i) preferred stock of the newly formed acquiring corporation, (ii) stock of
its parent, and (iii) cash.92 The acquiring corporation was immediately liq-
uidated by its parent.9 3 The Court determined that the parent was not "a
party to a reorganization. ' ' 94 Although the Court interpreted the statutory
definition of the term "party to a reorganization" expansively, it strongly
implied that receipt of stock or assets was necessary for a corporation to be-
come a party to a reorganization. 95 This reading of the statute is superfi-
cially attractive, because the statute defined a party to a reorganization to
include a corporation resulting from a reorganization and, in effect, both
corporations in a B reorganization. 96 Such corporations would receive some-
thing in a reorganization, and the acquiring parent in Groman did not. Upon
closer inspection, this reading of the statute falters. If the conditions that
continuity was intended to satisfy were met-if continuity existed-then the
parent should have been considered to be a party to a reorganization.
97
The subsidiary and the target corporation were parties to a reorganiza-
tion because shareholders of the target and the subsidiary exchanged stock
and had engaged in a reorganization. 98 The parent corporation, however,
acted as a mere "agent" in effecting the reorganization. 99 The Court re-
jected the argument of the taxpayer (a shareholder of the target) that the
subsidiary was the alter ego of the parent. 0 0 The parent participated in the
reorganization, but had not received anything directly as a result of its sub-
sidiary's acquisition of the acquired corporation's stock.' 0 ' The Court held
that stock of the parent corporation used in the exchange was not under the
nonrecognition aegis of section 354's predecessor. 102 Therefore, receipt of
the parent's stock was taxable to the acquired corporation's shareholders just
as if the acquiring subsidiary had transferred cash, not stock of its parent. 1
03
Remote continuity was condemned again the next year in Hdverzng v.
91. 302 U.S. 82 (1937).
92. See id. at 83-84.
93. See id. at 84.
94. Id. at 90.
95. Id at 87-88.
96. See id at 85.
97. See in/fa text accompanying notes 128-31.
98. See 302 U.S. at 88.
99. See id at 89.
100. Id.
101. 302 U.S. at 85-90.
102. See in/a text accompanying notes 35-36.
103. An A reorganization between the acquired corporation and the acquiring subsidiary
occurred. It was premised upon the acquired corporation's shareholders' receipt of the subsidi-
ary stock equalling 41% of the total consideration received. See 302 U.S. at 83-84.
19841
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
Bashford.104 There, the acquiring parent obtained the assets of several cor-
porations and transferred them to its newly-formed subsidiary.' 0 5 The par-
ent's possession of the acquired corporations' assets was determined to be
temporary and, therefore, was disregarded by the Supreme Court. 10 6 In a
brief opinion, the Court held that the parent was not a party to a reorganiza-
tion, relying upon Groman.'0 7 Although this transaction was considered to be
a reorganization, as in Groman, receipt of the parent corporation's stock was
taxable to the acquired corporation's shareholders under section 354's prede-
cessor, because the parent was not a party to the reorganization. 108
Remote continuity also has been analyzed in several lower court deci-
sions, most of which were rendered about the time the Supreme Court de-
cided Bus & Transport Securties, Groman and Bashford.'0 9 Some of the cases
are garden variety variations of Groman or Bashford-stock or assets of the
acquired corporation were exchanged for stock of a related corporation that
was not a party to a reorganization." l0 Some of the cases, however, articu-
lated certain themes also found in Groman and Bashford in denying party-to-
a-reorganization status to a participant in the acquisition.
The agency theory that later would be rejected by the Groman court was
rejected earlier in Beech v. Commissioner.1"' In Beech, the acquiring corpora-
tion proposed a stock-for-stock exchange with the shareholders of the target
corporation."t 2 The former corporation then used two other, independent,
corporations to effect the exchange after deciding that the original plan
could be delayed by a required application for government approval.113 Cu-
riously, shareholders of the acquired corporation were not informed of the
new plan. 1 4 The independent corporations acquired 76 percent of the ac-
quired corporation's stock for cash and the rest for stock of the acquiring
corporation.' 15
The court concluded that no reorganization had occurred. 116 The in-
dependent corporations could not be considered to be the agents of the ac-
quiring corporation and, therefore, were not parties to a reorganization., '7
Consequently, the acquired corporation's shareholders were outside the
scope of section 354's predecessor." 18
Arguably, the parent and wholly-owned subsidiary participants in Gro-
104. 302 U.S. 454 (1938).
105. See id at 455.
106. See id. at 458.
107. See id. at 456-57.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. The reorganization was an A reorganization.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 86-108.
110. Eg., Lawrence v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1941) (complicated factual
setting, in which stock of acquiring parent held to be taxable boot because parent was not a
party to a reorganization).
111. 82 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1936).
112. Seeid at 43.
113. See id. at 44.
114. See id. at 43-44.
115. See id. at 44.
116. See id. at 45.
117. See id. at 44.
118. See id. at 45.
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man present a stronger agency case than the unrelated parties in Beech. Par-
ent and subsidiary combinations have been vindicated by amendments to
the reorganization statutes.' 19 Aside from the statutes, however, the control
factor of this setting should raise a presumption of agency. On the other
hand, it could be contended that unrelated parties can be hired as agents in
specific circumstances, although apparently not in Beech. If so, the agents
can be ignored and the exchange could be treated as a reorganization.
120
The relevance of the parent and subsidiary connection can be seen in
another case, Hedden v. Commiss'oner.' 2 1 The Hedden taxpayer unsuccessfully
argued another Groman theory, that there was an identity between the ac-
quiring parent and its subsidiaries.12 2 The acquiring corporation exchanged
its bonds and cash for assets of the acquired corporation and then transferred
those assets to two of its subsidiaries.' 23 The taxpayer, a shareholder of the
acquired corporation, argued that the acquiring parent was the real party in
interest.' 2 4 Citing Groman, however, the court concluded that the acquiring
parent could not be identified with its subsidiaries. '25 The subsidiaries had
lives separate from their parent and, in fact, became indebted to their parent
for the consideration used in the acquisition.' 2 6 Therefore, the parent was
not a party to the reorganization.
27
As can be seen, continuity can be roughly equated with being a party to
a reorganization. The above cases indicated that if stock of a corporation
that is not a party to a reorganization is used, continuity will be too remote
to sustain a reorganization for tax purposes. This equivalence probably is
less apparent in the typical continuity cases where the type and amount of
the consideration and not the status of the contributing corporation are at
issue. 128
The doctrine of continuity of interest was developed to bestow certain
tax benefits only in bonafide reorganizations. It should follow that whenever
there is a problem with remote continuity, these benefits should be denied
because a true reorganization has not occurred. Remote continuity, how-
ever, rests on a baroque foundation. Groman intimates that a corporation
cannot be a party to a reorganization unless it receives stock or assets.'
29
Mere receipt is little more than a formalistic objection. If the Bashford court
could disregard the formal step of transferring assets to the acquiring par-
119. See infra text accompanying notes 142-49.
120. Although intermediate steps are frequently ignored when taken by related parties, see,
e.g., Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938), they certainly can be ignored even when taken
by unrelated parties, see, e.g., American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, II T.C. 397 (1948).
afdper curiain, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). See also infra text
accompanying notes 212-23 (discussion of step transaction doctrine).
121. 105 F.2d 311 (3d Cir.) cer. denied, 308 U.S. 575 (1939).
122. See id. at 313.
123. Interestingly, the quality of the consideration, bonds, was not addressed.
124. See 105 F.2d at 313.
125. See id. at 313-14.
126. See id. at 315.
127. Id. at 315.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
129. See supra note 95.
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ent,' 30 then remote continuity also can entertain disregard of other matters
of form. Substantive theories, such as agency and parent-subsidiary identity,
should be and were raised in some of the older remote continuity cases in
order to ascertain whether or not continuity existed in a remote continuity
context.13 1 These points and others are developed below.1
32
E. Development of a Statutog Continuity of Interest
Courts, not Congress, imbued the early federal tax statutes with the re-
quirement of continuity of interest. Congress's subsequent amendments to
the reorganization statutes promoted continuity by requiring shareholders of
the acquired corporation to receive a specified proprietary interest in the
acquiring corporation. These amendments diminished instances in which
remote continuity could destroy a reorganization.
Congress first required that a statutory continuity requirement be ful-
filled with the Revenue Act of 1924, by permitting a transfer of assets to a
corporation that was controlled by the transferor (the acquisitive type of D
reorganization). 13 3 Continuity was fostered because the transferor was re-
quired to own at least 80 percent of the corporation to which it transferred
assets.134
Congress again expanded continuity when it enacted the Revenue Act
of 1934. There, Congress required that in the acquisition of stock for stock
or the acquisition of assets for stock-a modern B and a somewhat modern C
reorganization-the acquiring corporation must use solely voting stock to
acquire either (i) at least 80 percent of the voting stock and at least 80 per-
cent of all other stock of the acquired corporation or (ii) substantially all the
assets of the acquired corporation.' 35 (Only in 1954 did C reorganizations
assume their current form.)1 36 This restriction markedly increased the quan-
tity and quality of qualifying consideration that the acquiring corporation
had to provide. Under the 1921 predecessor of the 1934 statute, the acquir-
ing corporation needed only to obtain a majority of a corporation's voting
and other stock in a B reorganization.' 37 Neither B nor C reorganizations
heretofore had required use of voting stock.'
38
130. See supra text accompanying note 106.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 111-23.
132. See infia text accompanying notes 152-302.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 46.
134. See Revenue Act of 1924, supra note 46, § 203(h)(1)(D).
135. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112 (g), 48 Stat. 705 (1934).
136. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B) (1982). The definition of a C reorganization was expanded in
1954 to permit the acquiring corporation to use voting stock to acquire no less than 80% of the
assets of the acquired corporation. Liabilities of the acquired corporation that the acquiring
corporation assumes are treated as money paid for the acquired corporation's assets.
137. See supra text accompanying note 44.
138. See generally supra notes 44-45. The 1934 expansion was the result of a congressional
dialectic in which a House Ways and Means subcommittee proposed repeal of the reorganiza-
tion provisions. Ultimately, the Ways and Means Committee severely restricted reorganiza-
tions, and the more moderate stance of the Senate Finance Committee prevailed. See
PRELIMINARY REP. OF A SUBCOMM. ON THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE 8-9 (Comm. Print 1933); H. R. REP. No. 704, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted n 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 554, 564; S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 586, 598-99.
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Thus, by 1934, B, C, and D reorganizations were removed from the
judicial tests used to detect continuity. If, for example, an acquired corpora-
tion's shareholders had received any consideration in a reorganization con-
summated in 1935,. other than the acquiring corporation's voting stock, a C
reorganization could not take place. Applying the lesser numerical or quali-
tative standards of Mz'nnesota Tea or Nelson to these reorganizations became
irrelevant. 139
As the definition of reorganization was tightened in 1934, the term "a
party to a reorganization" was modified to resemble its present-day succes-
sor, without the triangular reorganization additions. 140 In 1934, the term
was defined as a corporation resulting from a reorganization and both corpo-
rations in an acquisitive reorganization. 141
Instances of statutorily imposed continuity swelled in 1954 and in-
stances in which the problem of remote continuity could arise simultane-
ously diminished. The Code was amended to overcome the effects of Groman
and Bashford. C reorganizations were modified to allow the acquiring corpo-
ration to use the voting stock of its parent, thereby emasculating that hold-
ing of Groman which prohibited the parent corporation's stock from being
tendered as part of the consideration. 142
In Bashford, the intermediate step of transferring assets of the target cor-
poration to the acquiring corporation's parent was ignored and, because the
parent was not a party to a reorganization, the target shareholders' receipt of
this stock was taxable. 14 3 Bashford also was gutted. Under the 1954 changes
to the Internal Revenue Code, A and C reorganizations could occur even if
the acquiring corporation transferred all or some of the acquired corpora-
tion's assets to its controlled subsidiary. 144
Finally, the definition of a party to a reorganization was expanded to
include the parent and subsidiary corporations in all of the situations de-
scribed in the above two paragraphs. 145
The problem of remote continuity has diminished as a result of other
subsequent statutory modifications. Voting stock of the acquiring corpora-
tion's parent can be used in a B reorganization and all or some of the ac-
quired corporation's stock can be dropped into the acquiring corporation's
139. See supra note 135. The reorganizations in Mitnesota Tea Co., Watts, and John A. Nelson
Co. could not have qualified as reorganizations after 1934, because the acquired corporation's
shareholders did not receive solely voting stock of the acquiring corporation. See supra text
accompanying note 135.
140. See supra text accompanying note 30.
141. Revenue Act of 1934, supra note 135, § 1 12(g)( 2 ).
142. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) ("the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for . . .
its voting stock (or in exchange solely for . . . the voting stock of a corporation which is in
control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially all of the properties of another corpora-
tion . . ."). See infra note 149. See generally Lurie,Namorg-or Groman Reversed 10 TAX L. REV. 119,
134-42 (1954). The author is indebted to Lurie's article for the title to this article.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
144. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(C) (1982).
145. See I.R.C. § 368(c) (1982). As Lurie notes, the holdings of many pre-1954 remote con-
tinuity cases would not have been affected by the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. Lurie, supra
note 142, at 134. It follows that their holdings remained relevant.
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subsidary.' 46 A corporation also is permitted to use its parent's stock (but
none of its own) to acquire the assets of the acquired corporation by
merger.' 47 Lastly, mergers were again modified to permit the acquiring cor-
poration to merge its subsidiary into the acquired corporation.' 48
From a historical perspective, remote continuity is not as much of a
problem as it used to be. Reorganizations that failed for some of the partici-
pants because they were not parties were recognized as bonafde reorganiza-
tions for these participants after enactment of the 1954 Code.1 49 Still,
problems of remote continuity do arise. All of the preceding statutory
amendments do not help a target parent merge downstream into a subsidi-
ary which is immediately merged into the acquiring corporation. Instead,
we must review the authority that has developed around continuity and the
problem of remote continuity.
II. REMOTE CONTINUITY OF INTEREST IN ACQUISITIVE
REORGANIZATIONS
As can be seen, remote continuity is an irritant to tax planners. It also is
a formalistic problem. °50 Continuity depends upon the type and amount of
consideration received.' 5 ' Remote continuity further hampers reorganiza-
tions when it arises because it emphasizes the identity of the recipient, which
must be a party to a reorganization. The balance of this article analyzes
methods of grappling with the problem of remote continuity. The objectives
sought by denying reorganization status when only remote continuity exists
can be satisfied by current authority that emphasizes the substance of the
remote continuity problem rather than meeting formalistic conditions. De-
nying reorganization status to transactions in which there is remote con-
tinuity is unnecessary to insure execution of a bonafide reorganization. The
reasons for which it is unnecessary are set forth below.
146. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(C) as amended by Pub. L. No.188-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964)
(current version at I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B),(a)(2)(C)). The definition of a party to a reorganiza-
tion also was amended to reflect these changes.
147. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-621, 82 Stat. 1310 (1968). The
acquired corporation was required to exchange substantially all its assets for stock of the acquir-
ing corporation's parent.
148. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E), as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-693, 84 Stat. 2075 (1971). The
definition of a party to a reorganization was amended accordingly. See generally, Ferguson &
Ginsburg, Triangular Reorganizations, 28 TAx. L. REV. 159 (1973). G reorganizations, unlike
other reorganizations, have sprung forth (so far) fully-grown from Congress. When G reorgani-
zations were added to the Code in 1980, variations allowed in other types of reorganizations
were permitted. All or some of the acquired corporation's assets can be transferred to the ac-
quiring corporation's subsidiary, § 368(a)(2)(C), and stock of the acquiring corporation's parent
can be exchanged by the acquiring corporation for substantially all of the acquired corpora-
tion's assets, § 368(a)(2)(D).
149. As Lurie notes, supra note 145, at 134, many of the pre-1954 holdings were unaffected
by the 1954 amendments. Groman would still fail, because stock of the acquiring parent and
subsidiary were used. In order for I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A) and (a)(2)(D) to apply, stock of only
one of these corporations can be used. Bashford was legitimized only in 1968. See I.R.C.
§ 368(a) (2) (D), supra note 147.
150. Cf supra text accompanying note 129.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
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A. Identity Between Parent and Subsid'ay
A feature common to Groman and Bashford is that the acquiring corpo-
rate groups were parent corporations and their wholly-owned subsidiaries. '
52
As has been observed,' 53 this hermetic environment enhances the identifica-
tion of the acquiring parent and subsidiary and diminishes any problem of
remote continuity. The same can be said when the acquired corporation is
the wholly-owned subsidiary of another corporation.
Common sense supports identifying a parent corporation and its
wholly-owned subsidiary. Subsidiary corporations often are created solely to
expedite triangular reorganizations. 154  Stock of an acquiring corporation
received and retained by shareholders of the acquired corporation received
and retained by shareholders of the acquired corporation will lead to their
continuing interest whether the acquiring corporation retains the stock or
assets of the acquired company or transfers them to its subsidiary. Indeed,
the Code permits the acquiring parent both to place the stock or assets in a
subsidiary or withdraw them tax-free, 155 thereby suggesting an identity be-
tween the parent and subsidiary. Penalizing this transaction for failing to
establish a continuing proprietary interest is inconsistent with the fluidity
that otherwise characterizes the event. Conversely, assets or stock acquired
by a subsidiary in exchange for its parent's stock could be transmitted to and
from its parent without taxation.' 56 Should not it follow that parent and
subsidiary are sufficiently identical to overcome the problem of remote
continuity?
The Service's position is that a parent and subsidiary cannot be wholly
identified with one another. The regulations' 57 provide that the "term 'reor-
ganization'. . . imports a continuity of interest on the part of the transferor
or its shareholders in the properties transferred." The regulations continue,
stating that "[r]equisite to a reorganization . .. [is] a continuity of interest
. ..on the part of those persons who, directly or indireat/y, were the owners
of the enterprise prior to the reorganization."'
58
Although the regulation seemingly condones remote continuity (where,
for example, an acquired parent merges into its subsidiary, which then
merges into an acquiring corporation, so that shareholders of the acquired
parent receive stock of the acquiring corporation), early cases do not support
such a broad interpretation. Groman denied the legitimacy of remote con-
tinuity where the initial acquiring corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary,
152. See supra text accompanying notes 91-108.
153. Lurie, supra note 142, at 123-24.
154. E.g., Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937); Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S.
454 (1938).
155. The parent's dropping of property into a subsidiary can be accomplished tax-free as a
contribution to capital or as a transfer of property to a controlled corporation under I.R.C.
§§ 118 or 351, respectively. A subsidiary's distribution to its parent is eliminated from the par-
ent's separately calculated taxable income. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14(a) (dividend paid to an-
other member of an affiliated group is to be eliminated). See also I.R.C. § 243(a) (1982) (85
percent dividend-received deduction outside an affiliated group).
156. See supra note 155.
157. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(a) (1976).
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1980) (emphasis added).
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was immediately liquidated and assets of the acquired corporation passed to
the acquiring parent. 159 Nor has later authority, with one exception, ap-
proved of remote continuity in acquisitive reorganizations.16
0
Developments in tax law since Groman may modify the above answer.
Seemingly, the law surrounding affiliated groups might be one source for
creating a parent-subsidiary identity. The consolidated return regulations,
however, treat an affiliated group of corporations-a parent corporation and
one or more 80 percent controlled subsidiaries-as a single entity for some
purposes, but not for others.
16 '
Recent attacks on captive insurance companies provide stronger
grounds for imposing an indivisible identity on a parent and its subsidiary.
In Revenue Ruling 77-316,162 the Internal Revenue Service analyzed a cor-
poration's ability to insure itself through a captive insurance company. At
issue was whether or not the insured corporation could deduct premiums
paid for insurance to a wholly owned subsidiary. The ruling observed that
no risk-shifting or risk-distributing, the hallmarks of insurance, had oc-
curred.163 Though the insured and insuring corporations were separate enti-
ties, the ruling noted that they "represent one economic family with the
result that those who bear the ultimate economic loss are the same persons
who suffer the loss.' 1 64 No risk spreading occurred because the parent and
subsidiary had identical interests. 16 In a similar litigated case, the Tax
Court and Ninth Circuit decided in the Service's favor, but without ex-
pressly relying on the economic family theory.1
66
Revenue Ruling 77-316 mentions a leading nominee corporation case in
acknowledging that the parent and insurer subsidiary were independent cor-
porate entities. 16 7 The "nominee" corporation theory, to the extent that one
is recognized, 168 has been used to attach the tax consequences of a corpora-
tion to its owner where the corporation is a " 'dummy' or alter ego of its
shareholders, serving no other function and engaging in no significant busi-
ness activity."'1 69 Application of the nominee theory would permit identifi-
159. See supra text accompanying notes 91-103.
160. See generally Murray, How to Avoid Loss of Continuty of Interest Through "Stock Remoteness" in
a Reorg, 59J. TAX'N 8, 9-10 (1983) (on indirect continuity); accompanying notes 270-99 (remote
continuity in divisive reorganization).
161. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1501-11 (1983) (group's income is consolidated) and -77(a)
(parent is agent for subsidiaries) with Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11, -12 (1983) (consolidated taxable
income depends upon each group member's separate taxable income). See also Bennett Paper
Corp. v. Commissioner, 699 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1983) (subsidiary's activities cannot be attributed
to affiliated group to which it belongs).
162. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53.
163. Id at 54.
164. Id
165. See id
166. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1978), afd 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). See generally Note, Revenue Ruhng 77-316 and Carnation Co. v. Com-
missioner, An Analysis of the Attack on Captive Offhore Insurance Companies, 2 VA. TAX. REV. 111
(1982).
167. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
168. See generally Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead Dummy
Should Live, 34 TAX L. REV. 213 (1979).
169. BIT-rKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 12, at 2.10.
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cation of a parent and its subsidiary. Application of the theory, however,
often depends upon the nominee's action as its owner's agent and relative
lack of business activity, conditions which will not necessarily be true in all
reorganizations. 17
0
Upon first impression, captive insurance companies seem far afield from
remote continuity. But the common thread between the two areas is their
need, when appropriate, to identify parent and subsidiary corporations.
Identification is appropriate in the area of insurance, because risk-shifting
and risk-distributing are indicia of insurance and using a captive insurer ap-
parently precludes them from happening. Similarly, parent and subsidiary
corporations might be identified for continuity purposes. Subsidiaries en-
able acquiring corporations to do what they would prefer not to do or can-
not do directly. As the subsidiary's independence from its parent grows, as
measured by the parent's ownership of the subsidiary, the utility of the eco-
nomic family theory diminishes in the captive insurance area. 17 1 Seemingly,
increasing independence of a subsidiary should render this theory less useful
in the remote continuity context as well.
Of the various legal approaches for resolving a parent and subsidiary's
identity, an approach akin to the economic family theory of Revenue Ruling
77-316 appears to be the most sensible. A parent can and often does control
its wholly owned subsidiary. For the sole purpose of determining whether an
acquired corporation's shareholder retains a continuing interest in the ac-
quiring corporation, this control ensures that the interest will not be diluted
whether the acquiring corporation drops property into its subsidiary, uses its
parent's stock, or is subsequently absorbed by its parent.
B. Step Transaction Doctrine
Another method for analyzing whether or not both of two successive
reorganizations will be recognized as independent events is by determining
whether they should be stepped together. The step transaction doctrine,
which would allow two mergers to be treated as one, combines two events if
they are viewed as interrelated steps of a single transaction. If two events are
not interdependent, the separate effect of each step must be recognized.'
7 2
The point of departure into an analysis of the step transaction doctrine
and continuity of interest is Revenue Procedure 7 7- 3 7 .173 Revenue Proce-
dure 77-37 indicates that the Service will not issue advance rulings concern-
ing whether or not a reorganization has occurred unless:
170. See Kurtz and Kopp, Taxabidity of Straw Corporaiorns zn Real Estate Transactzons, 22 TAX
LAW. 647, 652 (1969); BIrTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 12, at 2.10. Indeed, it seems more
likely that the acquired parent will be a dummy corporation if its only asset is its subsidiary and
that subsidiary is an operating company.
171. To the extent that the captive insurer did not insure its parent's risks, both Rev. Rul.
77-316 and the Carnation courts allowed the parent a deduction for insurance premiums paid,
because those premiums were paid to outsiders for real insurance.
172. The origin of the step transaction doctrine is unclear, but at least one commentator has
suggested that it can be traced back to a 1932 case. See B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME ESTATES AND GiFTs § 4.3.5 n.74 (1981).
173. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
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there is a continuing interest through stock ownership in the ac-
quiring or transferee corporation (or a corporation in "control"
thereof within the meaning of section 368(c) of the Code) on the
part of the former shareholders of the acquired or transferor corpo-
ration which is equal in value, as of the effective date of the reor-
ganization, to at least 50 percent of the value of all of the formerly
outstanding stock of the acquired or transferor corporation as of
the same day. . . . Sales, redemptions, and other dispositions of
stock occurring prior or subsequent to the exchange which are part
of the plan or reorganization will be considered in determining
whether there is a 50 percent continuing interest through stock
ownership as of the effective date of the reorganization.1
74
Even if an acquired corporation's shareholders holding 50 percent of the ac-
quiring corporation's stock received in a reorganization sell this stock the
very day of the reorganization, the parties still can obtain a favorable rul-
ing. 175 But they cannot sell one share more if they wish to obtain a ruling,
unless the sale of that share is "unrelated" to the reorganization. 176 Further-
more, the potentially disqualifying disposition of one share can occur in a
variety of ways. It may occur directly, as in a cash sale by a dissenting share-
holder who refuses to accept the acquiring corporation's offer of a stock-for-
stock exchange. Or the disposition may occur indirectly, because some of the
acquired corporation's shareholders redeem their stock shortly before their
corporation is acquired.
77
Revenue Procedure 77-37 lists, but does not amplify, types of disposi-
tions occurring in proximity to a reorganization (sales, redemptions) that
may be considered part of the plan of reorganization. 78 Rather, the tainted
types of dispositions are revealed by rulings and case law. A recent case
highlights application of the step transaction doctrine to continuity in a sale
following a merger.
In McDonald's of Zion v. Comm'ssioner,17 9 out-of-favor franchisees sold
their McDonald's restaurants to the franchisor, McDonald's. The franchises
were closely held by three individuals and other related persons who held
their franchises through several corporations, all of which McDonald's
wanted to acquire. 180 Although the target corporations' shareholders in-
sisted upon being bought out for cash, they acquiesced to receiving McDon-
ald's stock, after receiving McDonald's apparent promise to enable them to
sell the stock to the public three months later. 18 ' McDonald's gave the
174. Id at 569. See generally McGaffey & Hunt, supra note 84, at 665-70.
175. Cf Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114 (50% of acquired corporation's shareholders re-
ceived cash; held, A reorganization). See also Campbell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 312 (1950)
(acq., 1951-1 C.B.) (reorganization followed by acquiring corporation's transfer of acquired cor-
poration's stock to its subsidiary; held, reorganization occurred).
176. Cf McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981) (subsequent sale not
combined with § 368(a)(1)(A) reorganization), revd, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
177. See generally McGaffey & Hunt, supra note 84, at 670-80; Freling and Martin, Current
Reorganization Techntques, 55 TAXES 852, 863-66 (1977); Blum, Corporate Acquisitions under the In-
come Tax: Another Approach, 50 TAXES 85, 90-93 (1972).
178. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. at 570-71.
179. 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
180. See 76 T.C. at 975-76.
181. See id. at 982.
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shareholders unregistered stock, which barred them from subsequently trans-
ferring the stock until it either was registered or conformed to another securi-
ties law rule that required the shareholders to hold the stock for at least two
years.' 8 2 McDonald's also gave the shareholders "piggy back" rights to reg-
ister and sell their stock when McDonald's next registered its stock for
sale.' 8 3 At the time of the negotiations, McDonald's expected to register
stock in three months. 18 4 Although the shareholders actually did not sell
their McDonald's stock as quickly as they wished, they were able to register
and sell it six months after they received it.i
8 5
The Tax Court concluded the mergers of the acquired corporations into
McDonald's were A reorganizations, even though the acquired corporations'
shareholders consistently intended to and did sell their McDonald's stock as
soon as they could.1 86 Therefore, McDonald's subsidiaries, the taxpayers,
were unsuccessful in claiming a cost basis in their newly acquired assets and,
instead, took a lower carry-over basis.'a 7 The court considered whether or
not continuity of interest had been maintained by the acquired corporations'
shareholders, concluding that there was no continuity because the merger in
which the stock was received and the stock's subsequent sale could not be
stepped together.' 88 Thus, the acquired corporations' shareholders main-
tained a continuing interest in the acquiring corporation for a sufficient
amount of time, even though they sold the acquiring corporation's stock as
soon as they could.i8 9 The court found the step transaction doctrine to be
inapplicable. 190
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court.' 9 ' It set forth three varia-
tions of the step transaction doctrine, and found that all three could be ap-
plied.' 9 2 In the first variation, the "end result test," "purportedly separate
transactions will be amalgamated with a single transaction when it appears
that they were really component parts of a single transaction intended from
the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result."' 9 3
This test also has been phrased as an intent test-did the parties always
intend to accomplish the end result? 194 The court concluded that all of the
steps were taken to cash out the franchisees and to do so to benefit McDon-
ald's.' 95 Therefore, the end result test was satisfied.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 985.
184. See id. at 979-80.
185. Id at 986-87.
186. See id. at 998-1000 & n.49.
187. See id. at 988, 1001. See I.R.C. §§ 358, 1012, (1982).
188. See id. at 998-99.
189. See id. at 1000 n.58.
190. See id at 998.
191. 688 F.2d 520, 528 (7th Cir. 1982).
192. See id. at 524-25.
193. 688 F.2d at 524, citing the Tax Court's McDonald's opinion, 76 T.C. at 994. But see infra
text accompanying note 212 (step transaction doctrine not neatly divisible into three
variations).
194. See Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 247, 250 (1954).
195. See 688 F.2d at 524.
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In the second test, the "(mutual) interdependence test," "the steps are
so interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would
have been fruitless without a completion of the series." 19 6 The appellate
court rejected the Tax Court's conclusion that interdependence was to be
determined on the basis of whether or not the taxpayer was legally bound to
take all the steps. 19 7 Instead, it asked whether or not the mergers would
have taken place without McDonald's guarantee to the franchisees of the
salability of its stock, and concluded that it would not.' 98 The franchisees
had consistently indicated their desire to sell the McDonald's stock. They
negotiated for the right to force the registration of stock (which allowed the
stock to be sold) after a year.' 99 Therefore, the mergers and subsequent sales
were interdependent.
2°
Under the last test, the "binding commitment test," "if one transaction
is to be characterized as a 'first step' there [is] a binding commitment to take
the later steps." 20 1 The court noted that this is the most limiting statement
of the step transaction doctrine and originally had been formulated in order
to analyze steps separated by several years.20 2 In contrast, in the case before
it, the court concluded that the transactions were separated by a period of
six months and that application of the binding commitment test was unnec-
essary.2 0 3 Were it applied, however, it would have been met because the
parties were bound to carry through on the stock registration. 20 4 The fran-
chisees could not transfer the stock if it was not registered and McDonald's
could not be forced to register the stock.20 5 McDonald's and the franchisees
were bound to take both steps.
20 6
The Tax Court had taken a narrower view of the step transaction doc-
trine. The taxpayer had argued that application of the end result test was
appropriate, while the government countered that McDonald's non-involve-
ment in the franchisees' sale of McDonald's stock precluded the doctrine's
application. 20 7 In fact, the court reasoned that application of the step trans-
action doctrine might be appropriate, but only upon careful analysis. 20 8 It
continued, stating that because post-merger continuity is not required for
any specific amount of time, the mutual interdependence test (which does
not require fulfillment of a time period either) is the most fitting variation of
the step transaction doctrine. 20 9 The end result and intent tests, which the
196. 688 F.2d at 524 (citing Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981)).




201. 688 F.2d at 525 (citing Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d at 1178 (quoting Commis-
sioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968))).





207. See 76 T.C. at 994.
208. See id. at 995.
209. See id at 997.
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court distinguished from the interdependence test and also from one an-
other, were alternatively too simplistic and too difficult to administer.2 10
The court determined that the mergers and the franchisees' subsequent sales
were not mutually interdependent, and the mergers did qualify as
reorganizations.
2 1i
The Seventh Circuit approached McDonald's with an expansive view of
the applicability of the step transaction doctrine, while the Tax Court ap-
plied the doctrine more discreetly and reasonably. As explained below, the
few cases that have applied the doctrine to post-merger dispositions all have
used the mutual interdependence test employed by the Tax Court. Re-
cently, this test has been used with greater frequency, so that its application
comports with current trends in tax law.
The step transaction doctrine was designed to deal with problems in
other areas of the tax law. A seminal article regarding the doctrine written
thirty years ago2 12 concluded that most cases concerning the doctrine arise
under sections 351 or 368(a)(1)(D). Both sections require control of the cor-
porate transferee by the corporate transferor (or by or in conjunction with its
shareholders, under the latter section) "immediately after" the transfer, in
order to effect a transfer to a controlled corporation (section 351) or in a
divisive reorganization (section 368(a)(1)(D)). The genesis of the doctrine in
the sections 351 and 368(a)(1)(D) areas naturally indicates a cautious appli-
cation of the doctrine to a foreign area, such as post-reorganization
continuity.
Few cases actually have applied the step transaction doctrine to post-
merger dispositions. Those cases did not articulate their theoretical basis
but, to the extent that one exists, it appears to be that the steps at issue were
mutually interdependent.
The test of mutual interdependence is best illustrated by American Ban-
tam Car Co. v. Commissioner.21 3 There, owners of a business transferred the
business's assets to a new corporation in exchange for all of its common
stock. 2 14 The incorporation was part of the owners' plan to sell the new
company's preferred stock to the public as well as to transfer some of the
common stock to the underwriters if they sold the preferred stock.2 15 The
owners' contract to transfer common stock to the underwriters, contingent
upon the underwriters' sale of preferred stock, was not executed until five
days after the owners received the new company's stock,2 16 and the under-
210. See id at 998 n.48.
211. Seeid at 998, 1000.
212. Mintz & Plumb, supra note 194, at 250. See also Paul & Zimet, Step Transactions, in
SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 200 (2d series 1938) (earlier treatment of the doc-
trine); Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent Developments in the Step Transaction Doctrine, 60 TAXES 970, 971
(1982) (increasing use of interdependence test).
213. 11 T.C. 397 (1948),aJfdper cunam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949),cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920
(1950). See McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972, 997, rev'd sub nom. McDonald's
Restaurants of Illinois v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). (American Bantam Car Co.
articulates mutual interdependence test); Mintz & Plumb, supra note 194, at 251 n.25 (present-
ing same idea).
214. 11 T.C. at 399.
215. See id
216. See id. at 400.
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writers did not receive the common stock for another five months, after they
sold the preferred stock.2 17 Because the underwriters received over 20 per-
cent of the corporation's common stock, the owners would not be considered
to have received the stock under section 351's predecessor if all of the steps
were collapsed into one.
2 18
The Tax Court held that the owners controlled the corporation imme-
diately after they exchanged their business's assets for the corporation's
stock. 2 19 Therefore, section 351's predecessor applied:
The standard required by the courts to enable them to say that a
series of steps are interdependent and thus should be viewed as a
single transaction do not exist here. It is true that all the steps may
have been contemplated under the same general plan . . . yet the
contemplated arrangement for the sale of preferred stock to the
public was entirely secondary and supplemental to the principal
goal of the plan-to organize the new corporation and exchange its
stock for the [transferor's] assets. The understanding with the un-
derwriters for disposing of the preferred stock, however important,
was not a sine qua non in the general plan, without which no other
step would have been taken. While the incorporation and ex-
change of assets would have been purposeless one without the
other, yet both would have been carried out even though the con-
templated methods of marketing the preferred stock might fail.
The very fact that in the contracts of June 8, 1936 [made five days
after the assets-for-stock exchange], the associates retained the right
to cancel the marketing order and, consequently the underwriters'
means to own common stock issued to the associates, refutes the
proposition that the legal relations resulting from the steps of or-
ganizing the corporation and transferring assets to it would have
been fruitless without the sale of the preferred stock in the manner
contemplated.
220
Whether or not control exists immediately after an exchange intended
to qualify under section 351 has been litigated extensively. 22 1 The hallmark
of the interdependence of steps, as illustrated in the Section 351 area-
whether "the steps are so interdependent that the legal relations created by
one transaction would be meaningless without a completion of the se-
ries" 2 22-appears to be whether the transferor was bound to dispose of
enough stock, when he received it, that would result in his loss of control
(notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit's contrary opinion in McDonald's.)
223
With this background, the few cases that have analyzed post-merger
dispositions can be addressed. The earliest of these cases is Anheuser-Busch,
217. Id. at 402.
218. See id at 403-05. The new corporation argued that § 351's predecessor did not apply so
that it could have a higher basis in the assets.
219. Id at 404.
220. American Bantam Car, 11 T.C. at 406-07.
221. See generally Bittker & Eustice, supra note 12, at 3.10.
222. Paul & Zimet, supra note 212, at 254.
223. McDonald's, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 179-85,
191-206.
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Inc. v. Commi'ssioner. 224 There, the taxpayer exchanged assets of an ice cream
company it operated through a subsidiary with the Borden Company for
Borden stock.225 Anheuser-Busch transferred its subsidiary's assets to Bor-
den and to a newly formed Borden subsidiary, to which Borden quickly
transferred the assets it had received.
226
The Board of Tax Appeals determined that Anheuser-Busch and Bor-
den had not engaged in a reorganization. 22 7 Because the plan of reorganiza-
tion contemplated the transfer of assets to Borden's subsidiary, the subsidiary
and not Borden was a party to a reorganization. 228 Use of Borden's stock by
the subsidiary was fatal. The court premised its conclusion that Borden was
not a party to a reorganization on Anheuser-Busch's knowledge that Borden
intended to transfer the ice cream business assets to its subsidiary. 229 Ini-
tially, the evidence supporting this conclusion appears to be slender. Bor-
den's offer to Anheuser-Busch to acquire its ice cream business stated only
that Borden was at liberty to organize a new corporation with which to con-
tinue the ice cream business.2 3 0 As the court explained, "the intervention of
a subsidiary will be treated as a, part of the plan, if it is a contemplated
possibility under the plan and actually eventuates. ' 231 The court's conclu-
sion seems justified, however, partly because Anheuser-Busch's transfer of
some of its ice cream company assets directly to Borden's subsidiary implies
that Anheuser-Busch knew the destination of its subsidiary's assets.
In Goldwasser v. Commissioner,232 two corporate transfers occurred back-
to-back. One corporation acquired another corporation's stock in a stock-
for-stock exchange.2 33 The acquiring corporation decided one month later
to liquidate the target corporation and have the target's assets acquired by
another of its subsidiaries, and effected this decision two months later.
234
The Board of Tax Appeals determined that the corporation that initially
acquired the target corporation's stock was not a party to a reorganization,
so that use of its stock was fatal to the existence of a reorganization. 23 5
Again, a letter that was part of the negotiations evidenced the acquiring
corporation's intent to liquidate the acquired corporation and transfer its
assets to another of its subsidiaries.
236
In a third case, Campbell v. Commissioner,237 Bethlehem Steel agreed to a
224. 40 B.T.A. 1100 (1939), af'd sub nom. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Helvering, 115 F.2d 662
(8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699 (1941).
225. See 40 B.T.A. at 1102-03.
226. See id. at 1104.
227. See id. at 1106.
228. d.
229. See i at 1107.
230. See id. at 1103.
231. Id at 1106. Accord, Atwood Grain & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 412 (1973)
(E reorganization); Avco Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 975,acq. 1957-1
C.B. 3, 5, nonacq. 1958-2 C.B. 9 (C reorganization).
232. 47 B.T.A. 445 (1942), affdper curiam, 142 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 765
(1944).
233. See 47 B.T.A. at 447.
234. See id. at 449.
235. See id. at 454.
236. See id. at 453.
237. 15 T.C. 312 (1950), acq., 1951-1 C.B. 1.
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stock-for-stock exchange in order to acquire a small steel manufacturer. The
target corporation's shareholders were interested in having their company
acquired only if the acquisition were a tax-free reorganization.2 38 In Sep-
tember, 1943, the two companies agreed to effect the reorganization. 2 39 The
following month, Bethlehem Steel acquired another company and, at this
time, first thought of disposing of the corporation it had just acquired be-
cause possession of both companies created antitrust problems. 240 In a series
of transactions that occurred in late 1943 and early 1944: Bethlehem Steel
acquired the stock of the first corporation; Bethlehem Steel sold the acquired
corporation's stock to one of its subsidiaries; the subsidiary sold the acquired
corporation's stock to another subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel; and the ac-
quired corporation was dissolved.
24 1
The Tax Court questioned whether or not the Bethlehem Steel stock
received by the acquired corporation's shareholders was stock of a party to a
reorganization. 242 Unlike its decisions in the preceding cases, however, the
court determined that Bethlehem Steel was a party to a reorganization.
243
In the court's view, the acquired corporation's shareholders had bargained
for and obtained stock in the company that they expected would acquire
their company. 2 44 Bethlehem Steel's subsequent disposition of the stock of
the acquired corporation was not part of a plan of reorganization, and so
Bethlehem Steel was a party to a reorganization.
245
One other case bears noting because it addresses the question of con-
tinuity in a statutory merger. In Heintz v. Commissioner,246 as in McDonald's,
shareholders of the acquired corporation wished to sell their stock for cash
rather than stock of the acquiring corporation. 2 47 The court denied reorgan-
ization status to the merger, due to a lack of continuity. 248 As reasoned by
the Tax Court in McDonald's, however, the acquired corporation's sharehold-
ers in Heintz agreed to accept stock only because the acquiring corporation
agreed to arrange a sale soon after the reorganization. 249 In other words, the
Heintz shareholders "committed themselves to sell" their stock.250 In con-
trast, in McDonald's, the acquiring corporation acted passsively, merely aid-
ing the acquired corporation's shareholders to sell their stock through piggy-
back rights.
25 1
The appellate court disagreed with the Tax Court in McDonald's, re-
238. Id at 314.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 316.
241. See id. at 317-18.
242. Id at 319.
243. See id at 321.
244. Id at 320.
245. Id. at 319-20.
246. 25 T.C. 132 (1955), nonacq. 1958-1 C.B. 7.
247. See id. at 134.
248. See id at 142.
249. See id. at 142-43.
250. McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972, 1001 (1981), rev'dsub nom. McDon-
ald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
251. See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 524-25.
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garding its case and Heintz as being indistinguishable. 25 2 The Tax Court's
perception appears to be more accurate. The sellers received an oral promise
in Heintz that their stock in the acquiring corporation would be sold in a
public offering although, in fact, private sales were made. 253 In contrast, the
sellers in McDonald's obtained only a written promise that their stock could
be registered in the next public offering. 254 The purchaser in McDonald's
was not as active a participant in the sale of the stock as it was in Heintz.
The common thread of the post-merger continuity cases is the interde-
pendence of the merger and a subsequent step. The interdependence of suc-
cessive mergers depends upon development of surrounding facts. On the one
hand, successive mergers within an affiliated group necessarily will be inter-
dependent, because the group's parent will control the events. Indeed, appli-
cation of the end result test of the step transaction doctrine might be more
appropriate than the interdependence test since the key to applying the doc-
trine will be the parent's control of all of the events. Documentation sur-
rounding the transactions might suggest the interdependence of the
mergers. 25 5 Even if the mergers appear to be independent of one another,
this independence could be illusory since the parent would not have its sub-
sidiaries engage in the first merger if it did not expect them to engage in the
second one as well.
The independence of successive mergers can be established more easily
if the acquired and acquiring groups of corporations are unrelated. If an
acquired parent merges downstream and the surviving subsidiary then
merges into an unrelated corporation, the steps might be treated as being
independent of one another because shareholders' approval must be ob-
tained twice.2 56 The shareholders of the acquired corporations will be
roughly the same shareholders in both situations-the shareholders of the
target parent will become the shareholders of the target subsidiary, less any
dissenters. 257 Presumably, they will approve the second merger if they can
be convinced to approve the first. But, if the shareholders of the acquiring
corporations also must approve the mergers, they will be different from one
another. The shareholders of the acquiring corporation will be the share-
holders of the acquired subsidiary in the first merger and the shareholders of
the unrelated acquiring corporation in the second. Obviously, a stronger
case can be made for independence when shareholder approval of the ac-
quiring corporation is necessary to effect the merger.
252. McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 525-26.
253. See Heintz, 25 T.C. at 137, 139.
254. See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 522.
255. Cf Campbell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 312 (1950) acq., 1951-1 C.B. I (court relied
partly on documents to find that subsequent disposition of stock was not part of the plan, and
therefore was independent).
256. Generally, a majority of the acquired corporation's shareholders must approve the
merger. See 15 Fletcher, supra note 21, § 7063. In some cases, shareholders of the acquiring
corporation also must approve the merger. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.78(D) (ap-
proval necessary when, for example, articles or by-laws of the acquiring corporation will change
or the target shareholders will acquire more than one-sixth of the voting power of the acquiring
corporation).




Another way in which to discern the independence of a merger from a
second merger is to question whether or not all of the participants engage in
both events. The critical feature in Campbell and McDonald's, at least in the
Tax Court's eyes, was that one of the parties engaging in post-merger events
acted independently of the other. In Campbell, the acquiring corporation
took actions without consulting the acquired corporation's shareholders.
2 58
In McDonald's, the acquired corporations' shareholders acted without the
consent of the acquiring corporation (although the corporation possessed
knowledge of the acquired corporations' shareholders' plans).259 The other




Another line of authority deserves mention, if only as an illustration of
the type of evidence that can sustain-or defeat-continuity of interest.
Whether or not a subsequent disposition of stock acquired in a reorganiza-
tion was part of an earlier plan of reorganization can be inferred from the
time that has lapsed between the stock's acquisition and disposition. The
disposition of stock is more likely to be part of a plan of reorganization if it is
disposed of ten days rather than ten years after its acquisition.
26 '
The Service has demarked holding stock for five years after a reorgani-
zation as a length of time that will establish continuity. In Revenue Ruling
66-23,262 one corporation entered into an antitrust consent decree in which it
agreed to merge its subsidiary into an unrelated corporation, in exchange for
stock of the acquiring corporation. As part of the decree, the parent also was
required to divest itself of the acquiring corporation's stock within seven
years of acquiring it, although it was free to hold or dispose of the stock as it
wished during this seven year period. Revenue Ruling 66-23 held that the
merger of the subsidiary into the unrelated corporation was an A reorganiza-
tion. It held that continuity of interest is met if an acquired corporation's
shareholder receives stock of the acquiring corporation
without any preconceived plan or arrangement for disposing of any
of the stock and with unrestricted rights of ownership for a period
of time sufficient to warrant the conclusion that such ownership is
definite and substantial, notwithstanding that at the time of the
reorganization the shareholder is required by a court decree to dis-
pose of the stock before the end of such period. Ordinarily, the
Service will treat 5 years of unrestricted rights of ownership as a
258. Campbell, 15 T.C. at 318.
259. See McDonald's, 76 T.C. at 986, 988-99 n.50. Cf infa note 269 and accompanying text.
260. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1100, a d, 115 F.2d 662 (8th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699 (1941); Goldwasser v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 445 (1942); afd
per curiam, 142 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1944),cert. denied, 323 U.S. 765 (1944). See generally Faber, supra
note 36, at 526-30 (in plan of reorganization area, no consistent policy on whether or not all
parties must know of plan); Comment, McDonald's Restaurants of Illinois, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, A False Step for Continuity of Interest, 3 VA. TAX REv. 177 (1983) (to apply step transaction
doctrines, in McDonald's, both parties should agree or know about post-merger steps). But cf
Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 975 (1956),acq. 1957-2 C.B. 3, 5, nonacq. 1958-1 C.B.
9 (no C reorganization; however, target corporation shareholders' ignorance of plan of reorgani-
zation not a determinative factor).
261. Butcf Mintz & Plumb, supra note 194, at 249 (time is not necessarily determinative; the
temporal relationship is merely one scrap of evidence assisting the courts in applying their test).
262. 1966-1 C.B. 67.
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sufficient period for the purpose of satisfying the continuity of in-
terest requirements of a reorganization.
263
It would appear that to a reorganization that requires a disposition of stock,
even though no plan of disposition has been formulated, is innocuous if
purged by time.
264
This theme has been expanded by subsequent rulings. In Revenue Rul-
ing 68 -22,2
65 ten percent of an acquiring corporation's preferred stock re-
ceived in a merger could be redeemed annually, although the acquiring
corporation had no present intention to redeem the stock. The ruling held
that an A reorganization had occurred, although this ruling also must be
read in conjunction with Revenue Procedure 77-37.266 Since at least 50 per-
cent of the acquired corporation's shareholders would receive and retain
stock of the acquiring corporation for at least five years, continuity exists,
even for ruling purposes under Revenue Procedure 77-37.267
In an analogous ruling, more reminiscent of the rationale of the Tax
Court's decision in McDonald's,268 the Service considered a statutory merger
to be an A reorganization where the acquired corporation's shareholders
could rescind the merger agreement upon the occurrence of certain financial
contingencies, because the contingencies were beyond the control of the
shareholders.
26 9
Thus, if successive mergers are independent of one another, both can
qualify as A reorganizations.
C. Remote Continuity of Interest and Divisive Reorganizations
Another method for analyzing continuity in successive mergers lies in
the area of divisive reorganizations. Certain rulings in this area have
avoided a problem with remote continuity. These rulings have recently been
extended to acquisitive reorganizations as well.
A divisive reorganization occurs when the owners of a corporation that
runs two businesses decide to break the corporation into two corporations,
each of which will Own one of the businesses. This division entails use of
sections 355 and 368(a)(1)(D). 270 In a section 355 transaction, shareholders
or security holders of one corporation receive stock or securities in another
corporation without recognizing gain or loss. 2 7 t Section 355 requires that a
corporation that owns at least 80 percent of another corporation's stock (vot-
263. Id. at 68.
264. See Faber, supra note 81, at 251.
265. 1968-1 C.B. 142.
266. 1977-2 C.B. 568.
267. Cf Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114 (continuity satisfied in merger even though some
shareholders received cash).
268. McDonald'r, 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra text ac-
companying notes 179-190..
269. Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 112. The stock also was callable five years after the
merger and was subject to a sinking fund that commenced five years after the merger. Under
the rationale of Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67, these conditions could not adversely affect
continuity.
270. I.R.C. § 355 (1982 & West Supp. 1984); I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1982).
271. See I.R.C. § 355(a)(1).
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ing stock as well as all other stock) "immediately before [a] distribution" to
distribute stock of the other corporation to one or more of its shareholders.
272
Nor can the distribution be used "principally as device for the distribution of
the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled cor-
poration or both."'273 In a D reorganization, a corporation must transfer all
or a portion of its assets to another corporation if "immediately after the
transfer," the first corporation or one or more of its shareholders, or any
combination thereof owns at least 80 percent of the controlled corporation's
stock (both voting stock and all other stock).2 74 Because such control must be
acquired in a distribution to which section 355 applies,2 75 a D reorganiza-
tion always will entail a distribution of the controlled corporation's stock to
the distributing corporation's shareholders.
276
In other words, if a corporation owns two businesses, it could transfer
the second business to its shareholders by dropping the second business into
a subsidiary under section 368(a)(1)(D) and distributing the second corpora-
tion's stock to its shareholders under section 355. On the other hand, if it
already operates the second business through a wholly-owned subsidiary, it
could simply distribute the stock of that subsidiary to its shareholders under
section 355.
Any reorganization, including a divisive D reorganization, is subject to
the continuity of interest test set forth in Treasury Regulation section 1.368-
1(b). 2 7 7 This regulation provides that: "Requisite to a reorganization under
the Code . . . [is] a continuity of interest therein on the part of those persons
who, directly or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise prior to the
reorganization." 278 Any section 355 distribution, including one that is part
of a D reorganization, is subject to the continuity of interest test set forth in
Treasury Regulation section 1.355-2(c).279 This regulation "contemplates
. . . a continuity of interest in all or part of such business enterprise on the
part of those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the owners of the en-
terprise prior to the distribution or exchange."1280 But for certain cosmetic
changes, the two regulations use identical language.2 8 1 Therefore, if a trans-
272. See I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(D)(ii), 368(c).
273. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(A) and (B). This section also requires that (i) the distributing and
controlled corporations carried on active business for the five years immediately preceding the
distribution (§ 355(a)(1)(C), § 355(b)) and (ii) the distributing corporation distribute at least 80
percent of the controlled corporation's stock (both voting stock and all other stock)
(§ 355(a)(1)(D)).
274. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(D).
275. See § 355(a)(l)(D)(ii).
276. In contrast, in a nondivisive D reorganization, the distributing corporation must liqui-
date after it transfers its assets to the acquiring corporation. See supra note 26.
277. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(a).
278. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1981). Seegenerally Turnier, supra note 41, at 923-24 (ques-
tions this regulation); Bloom and Sweet, How IRS Uses Continuity of Interest to Raise New Problemsr in
Reorganizations, 45 J. TAX'N 130, 134-36 (1976) (discusses remote continuity); Murray, supra note
160, at 9 (same).
279. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1960).
280. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1983). Cf Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1).
281. But see Murray, supra note 160, at 10 (Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) requires interest in
entire business enterprise). This appears to be a difference from Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) with-
out a distinction.
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action meets the terms of one of these regulations, it follows that it should
meet the terms of the other.
The genesis of these regulations does not direct one to a contrary result.
The regulations were promulgated simultaneously under the 1954 Code.
282
Before that, the regulations issued under section 355 and section 368's prede-
cessors required continuity, but they were silent regarding indirect
continuity.
283
On the other hand, Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(b) does pro-
vide that "[r]equisite to a reorganization under the Code . .. [is] (except as
provided in sectt'on 368(a) (I) (D)) a continuity of interest .... *"284 What type
of continuity is required in a D reorganization? It must be the continuity
required of a divisive reorganization since nothing indicates that an acquisi-
tive reorganization must be accorded special treatment simply because it is a
D reorganization.
Technically, continuity of interest in a section 355 distribution might be
distinguished from another condition, that the distribution not be used prin-
cipally as a device for distributing a corporation's earnings and profits.
285
Factually, however, they appear to overlap. 28 6 If a person arranges to sell or
exchange his stock prior to its distribution to him, the distribution probably
will be regarded as a device and therefore be excluded from the benefits of
section 355.287 Assuming that the continuity and device conditions can be
equated in a section 355 distribution, then roughly the same purpose is ac-
complished by the continuity-device condition in such a distribution as by
continuity in an acquisitive reorganization. The continuity-device condition
restricts the sale of stock acquired in a section 355 distribution. Even if con-
tinuity can be distinguished from the device condition in a divisive distribu-
tion, section 355 continuity seemingly would preclude a post-distribution
sale,288 just as continuity limits the sale of stock acquired in an acquisitive
reorganization.
289
Theories that overcome the problem of remote continuity in an acquisi-
tive reorganization have not been explicitly condoned. Cases like Groman
illustrate this. On the other hand, remote continuity has been permitted by
the Internal Revenue Service in divisive distributions. If the requirements of
282. T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61.
283. See Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.112(b)( 1l)-2 (1953) (regarding I.R.C. § 355's predecessor):
Treas. Reg. 11i, § 29.11
2
(g)-1 (1943) (regarding I.R.C. § 368's predecessor).
284. Treas Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (emphasis added).
285. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B). See also Rev. Rul. 62-138, 1962-2 C.B. 95 (continuity discussed;
device clause not discussed); Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 C.B. 77 (device clause and continuity
both satisfied).
286. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 12, at 13.06 n.83; Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog:
A New Approach to Corporate Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1194, 1240-41
(1968).
287. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1); Bittker & Eustice,supra note 12, at 13.06.
288. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-103, 1955-1 C.B. 31 (post-distribution sale; held, no continuity).
I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) and Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1) also prohibit stock of the distributing cor-
poration from being sold or exchanged pursuant to a prearranged plan. In this sense, the device
clause is broader than and has no analogy to continuity in an acquisitive reorganization.
289. But see Murray, supra note 160, at 10-11 (continuity under section 355 is different from
continuity in acquisitive reorganizations).
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continuity are the same in both sections, then it follows that this interpreta-
tion can be applied to acquisitive reorganizations. Recently, the Service did
tentatively extend this rationale to acquisitive reorganizations.
The Service's concession of remote continuity under section 355 is clear-
est in Revenue Ruling 62-138.290 There, a bank was required by govern-
ment regulators to divest itself of real estate held by one of its subsidiaries.
The bank acceded to this demand by having the subsidiary create its own
subsidiary into which the first-tier subsidiary placed the real estate. The
subsidiary distributed the stock of the second-tier subsidiary to the bank
rather than retaining it. The second-tier subsidiary was created under sec-
tion 351 and its stock distributed under section 355. As part of the same
transaction, however, the second-tier subsidiary's stock was then distributed
by the bank to its shareholders. The second distribution also qualified under
section 355.
The ruling analyzed whether continuity existed in realistic terms. Sec-
tion 355 requires continuity, but it may be remote continuity. The ruling
states:
In the instant case, there is no change in the aggregate interests
held by the [bank's] shareholders, no new parties in interest were
added as a result of the transaction and none were eliminated. The
shareholders after the transaction held the same enterprises in
modified corporate form as before the transaction and the corpo-
rate enterprises were continued as such.
Less persuasive authority also exists. Stock of the distributing corpora-
tion was owned by a partnership in Revenue Ruling 76-528.29, The partner-
ship consisted of four individuals who decided to liquidate the partnership
for good business reasons. The distributing corporation transferred assets of
one of its two businesses to a new corporation and then distributed stock of
the new corporation to two of the partners in exchange for their stock in the
distributing corporation. The partnership was immediately dissolved, at
which time two of the partners owned stock of the distributing corporation
and the other two owned the stock of the new corporation. The ruling held
that distribution of the second corporation's stock to two of the shareholders
was a section 355 transaction because the partners stood in the shoes of the
partnership as the only parties who were qualified to receive and continue
the stock interests of the two corporations. As in Revenue Ruling 62-138,
interposition of a juristic entity-a partnership rather than a corporation-
did not stifle continuity of interest in a section 355 distribution.
In other rulings, the Service has ruled that an acquisitive reorganization
can follow a section 355 spin-off.292 These rulings, however, do not strongly
support remote continuity. In two of the three rulings, a corporation spun
off stock of a subsidiary which then was acquired by another corporation.
293
290. 1962-2 C.B. 95.
291. 1976-2 C.B. 103.
292. Rev. Rul. 78-251, 1978-1 C.B. 89 (section 355 spin-off followed by B reorganization);
Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125 (section 355 spin-off followed by A reorganization); Rev. Rul.
70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 83 (section 355 spin-off followed by B reorganization).
293. Rev. Rul. 78-251, 1978-1 C.B. 89; Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 83.
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In the third, the corporation spun off stock of a subsidiary and was itself then
acquired by another corporation. 294 On first impression there appears to be
remote continuity since shareholders of a corporation acquired and then dis-
posed of its subsidiary's stock. This remote continuity, however, is unlike the
remote continuity in successive acquisitive reorganizations, where sharehold-
ers of the first corporation to be acquired are separated by another corpora-
tion from the corporation in which their proprietary interest survives.
Section 355 forces the distribution of the corporation's subsidiary's stock up
to its shareholders. As that happens, nothing offensive occurs. These Reve-
nue Rulings were factually no different. The shareholders of the spun-off
corporations transferred stock or the assets of their corporation to an acquir-
ing corporation. They retained an interest in the acquiring corporation.
In contrast, something offensive does happen in successive acquisitive
reorganizations (without conceding that the offense, remote continuity,
should bar either reorganization from qualifying under section 368(a)(1) or
should prevent the participants from benefiting). A corporation is inter-
posed between the shareholders of the first acquired corporation and the one
in which they ultimately acquire stock. Similarly, something offensive oc-
curs when there are successive section 355 spin-offs, as in Revenue Ruling 62-
138295 (again, without conceding the disqualification of either spin-off from
treatment under section 355). Section 355 requires a distribution up to a
corporation's shareholders. It does not require, nor does it even permit, an-
other distribution up to the corporation's shareholders' shareholders.
The Service has analogized some of the remote continuity it acknowl-
edges in divisive distributions to acquisitive reorganizations. In Revenue
Ruling 84-30,296 one corporation (Y) acquired substantially all of the assets
of its sister's (Z's) wholly-owned subsidiary (N) in exchange for Y stock in a
C reorganization. Z liquidated N and distributed N's assets, Y stock, to its
and Y's parent, X.
The ruling held that the indirect continuity mandated by Treasury
Regulation 1.368-1 (b) was satisfied, since the indirect owner of N's business
enterprise before the reorganization, X, continued to possess an interest in
the enterprise after the reorganization. As in Revenue Ruling 62-138,297 on
which this ruling relied, X's aggregate interests did not change. The ruling
also cautioned that the relationships within this group had existed for many
years.
The issuance of Revenue Ruling 84-30 offers a toehold in the attempt to
apply divisive distribution remote continuity concepts to acquisitive reorga-
nizations. It signals the Service's concession to reasoning it has long resisted:
stock can be passed up a chain of owners, albeit an established chain, follow-
ing an acquisitive reorganization without damaging continuity. 298 Other
divisive distribution concepts also could be applied. For example, the Serv-
294. Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125.
295. Rev. Rul. 62-138, 1962-2 C.B. 95.
296. 1984-9 I.R.B. at 5. See generally Murray, IR.S Revocation of "Stock Remoteness" Posture
May Have Positive Effect on Reorgs, 60 J. TAX'N 352 (1984).
297. Rev. Rul. 62-138, 1962-2 C.B. 95.
298. See Murray, supra note 160, at 9-10.
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ice has ruled that an acquisitive reorganization can follow a divisive one if
the shareholders of the spun-off corporation retain stock of the acquiring
corporation. 299 By analogy, one acquisitive reorganization should be able
to follow another if the shareholders of the first acquiring company obtain
and retain stock of the second acquiring company. The Service can be ex-
pected to resist this comparison since it limited Revenue Ruling 84-30 to an
already established group of corporations, yet no clear reason exists for refus-
ing to extend the rationale used in divisive distribution rulings. If the rea-
soning were extended, it would enable the parties involved in two successive
mergers to enjoy the benefits of engaging in a reorganization.
E. Recharacierization
The last method for analyzing the problem of remote continuity is
recharacterization. If two successive reorganizations present a problem of
remote continuity, that problem might be avoided if both target corpora-
tions are acquired directly by the acquiring Service corporation. The Serv-
ice accepted this theory in Revenue Ruling 68-526.300 In this ruling, one
corporation owned sixty percent of another corporation. Pursuant to one
plan of reorganization, both corporations simultaneously transferred all their
assets to and had their liabilities assumed by a third, unrelated, corporation.
Each of the transactions qualified as a C reorganization.
Without much imagination, it can be seen that Revenue Ruling 68-526
presents an alternative mode for successive reorganizations. The target par-
ent and subsidiary corporations will disappear in successive reorganizations,
just as they did in the ruling. Remote continuity is unimportant, or at least
surmountable, in the ruling. If the parent had merged into its subsidiary
and the survivor had merged into the acquiring corporation, the aforemen-
tioned problem of remote continuity would have to be confronted. If both
target parent and subsidiary are acquired directly by the acquiring corpora-
tion, then one still must ask about continuity. Do shareholders of both ac-
quired corporations obtain and retain stock of the acquiring corporation?
Arguably not, since the acquired subsidiary's shareholder, the parent, has
disposed of whatever it received in its final distribution to its shareholders.
However, Revenue Ruling 68-526 determined that continuity should be
scrutinized and decided that it did exist, because the only persons entitled to
the acquiring corporation's stock received by the acquired parent, had it
survived, were the parent's shareholders.
30 1
It is unlikely that Revenue Ruling 68-526's rationale could be applied
to successive stock-for-stock exchanges, since the most likely route for elimi-
nating an acquired parent is through a downstream merger. The more prof-
itable analogy might lie in holding that successive mergers can be
299. See supra notes 292-94.
300. 1968-2 C.B. 156.
301. See also supra text at notes 290-91. Furthermore, the Service might favor application of
Rev. Rul. 68-526 if the parent is an operating, rather than a holding, company. Compare 82-4
TAX MGMT. MEM. (BNA) 9 (Feb. 22, 1982) with 83-15 TAX. MGMT MEM. (BNA) 6 (July 25,
1983).
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Continuity of interest remains a necessary element of any reorganiza-
tion, although recommendations have been made for the elimination of the
continuity test. 30 3 In some cases, continuity can be satisfied by meeting cer-
tain statutory tests. Continuity can be satisfied in other cases, such as statu-
tory mergers, by meeting well-established, if nevertheless sometimes elusive,
indicia of continuity. The problem of remote continuity of interest in succes-
sive statutory mergers, even if infrequently encountered, also must be
analyzed.
302. These reorganizations could be A or C reorganizations. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A), (C).
303. See supra note 6; Faber, supra note 81 at 261-67.
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